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Abstract
Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have boosted the performance of many graph
related tasks such as node classification and graph classification. Recent researches
show that graph neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which
deliberately add carefully created unnoticeable perturbation to the graph structure.
The perturbation is usually created by adding/deleting a few edges, which might
be noticeable even when the number of edges modified is small. In this paper, we
propose a graph rewiring operation which affects the graph in a less noticeable
way compared to adding/deleting edges. We then use reinforcement learning to
learn the attack strategy based on the proposed rewiring operation. Experiments
on real world graphs demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework.
To understand the proposed framework, we further analyze how its generated
perturbation to the graph structure affects the output of the target model.
1 Introduction
Graph structured data are ubiquitous in many real world applications. Various data from different
domains, such as social networks, molecular graphs and transportation networks can all be modeled
as graphs. Recently, increasing effort has been devoted towards developing deep neural networks on
graph structured data. This stream of works, which is known as Graph Neural Networks (GNN) [] has
shown to enhance the performance in many graph related tasks such as node classification [15, 12]
and graph classification [1, 7, 28, 29].
Recent researches have shown that deep neural networks are highly vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks [25, 11, 17, 2]. In computer vision, performing an adversarial attack is to add deliberately
created, but unnoticeable, perturbation to a given image such that the deep model misclassifies
the perturbed image. Unlike image data, which can be represented in the continuous space, graph
structured data is discrete. Few efforts have been made to investigate the robustness of graph neural
networks against adversarial attacks. Only recently, such researches about adversarial attacks on
graph structured data started to emerge. Zügner et al. [31] proposed a greedy algorithm to attack
the semi-supervised node classification task. Their method deliberately tries to modify the graph
structure and node features such that the label of a targeted node can be changed. Dai et al. [6]
proposed a reinforcement learning based algorithm to attack both node classification and graph
classification task by only modifying the graph structure. Zügner and Günnemann [32] designed a
meta-learning based attack method to impair the overall performance of the node classification task.
In these aforementioned works, the graph structure is modified by adding or deleting edges.
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To ensure the difference between the attacked graph and the original graph is “unnoticeable”, the
number of actions (adding/deleting edges) that can be taken by the attacking algorithms is usually
constrained by a budget. However, even when this budget is small, adding or deleting edges can still
make “noticeable” changes to the graph structure. For example, it is evident that many important
graph properties are based on eigenvalues and eigenvectors of the Laplacian matrix of the graph [3];
while adding or deleting an edge can make remarkable changes on the eigenvalues/eigenvectors of
the graph Laplacian [10]. Thus, in this work, we propose a new operation based on graph rewiring.
A single rewiring operation involves three nodes (vfir, vsec, vthi), where we remove the existing
edge between vfir and vsec and add edge between vfir and vthi. Note that vthi is constraint to be the
2-hop neighbor of vfir in our setting. It is obvious that the proposed rewiring operation preserves
some basic properties of the graph such as number nodes and edges, total degrees of the graph and etc,
while operations like adding and deleting edges cannot. Furthermore, the proposed rewiring operation
affects some of the important measures based on graph Laplacian such as algebraic connectivity
in a smaller way than adding/deleting edges, which we will theoretically show in Section 4.1. In
addition, the rewiring operation is a more natural way to modify the graph. For example, in biology,
the evolution of DNA and amino acid sequences could lead to pervasive rewiring of protein–protein
interactions [30].
In this paper, we aim to construct adversarial examples by performing rewiring operations for the
task of graph classification. More specifically, we treat the process of applying a series of rewiring
operations to a given graph as a discrete Markov decision process (MDP) and use reinforcement
learning to learn how to make these decisions. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
algorithm on real-world graphs and further analyze how the adversarial changes in the graph structure
affect both the graph embedding learned by the graph neural network model and the output label.
2 Background
In this section, we introduce notations and the target graph convolutional model we seek to attack.
We denote a graph as G = {V, E}, where V = {v1, . . . , v|V|} and E = {e1, . . . , e|E|} are the sets
of nodes and edges, respectively. The edges describe the relations between nodes, which can be
described by an adjacency matrix A ∈ {0, 1}|V|×|V|. Aij = 1 means vi and vj are connected, 0
otherwise. Each node in the graph has some features that are associated with it. These features are
represented as a matrix X ∈ R|V|×d, where the i-th row of X denotes the node features of node vi
and d is the dimension of features. Thus, an attributed graph can be represented as G = {A,X}.
2.1 Graph Classification
In the setting of graph classification, we are given a set of graphs G = {Gi}. Each of these graphs
Gi is associated with a label yi. The task is to build a good classifier using the given set of graphs
such that it can make correct predictions when new unseen graphs are fed into it. A graph classifier
parameterized by θ can be represented as f(G|θ) = yo, where yo denotes the label of a graph
G ∈ G predicted by the classifier. The parameters θ in the classifier f(·|θ) can be learned by solving
the following optimization problem minθ
∑
i L(f(Gi|θ), yi), where L(·, ·) is used to measure the
difference between the predicted and ground truth labels. Cross entropy is a commonly adopted
measurement for L(·, ·).
2.2 Graph Convolution Networks
Recently, Graph Neural Networks have been shown to be effective in graph representation learning.
These models usually learn node representations by iteratively aggregating, transforming and propa-
gating node information. In this work, we adopt the graph convolutional networks (GCN) [15]. A
graph convolutional layer in the GCN framework can be represented as
Fj = ReLU(D−
1
2AD−
1
2Fj−1Wj) (1)
where Fj ∈ RN×dj is the output of the j-th layer and Wj represents the parameters of this layer. A
GCN model usually consists of J graph convolutional layers, with F0 = X. The output of the GCN
model is FJ , which is denote as F for convenience. To obtain a graph level embedding uG for graph
G to perform graph classification, we apply a global pooling over the node embeddings.
uG = pool(F) (2)
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Different global pooling functions can be used, and we adopt the max pooling in this work. A
multilayer perceptron (MLP) and softmax layer are then sequentially applied on the graph embedding
to predict the label of the graph
yo = argmax softmax(MLP (uG|WMLP )) (3)
where MLP (·|WMLP ) denotes the multilayer perceptron with parameters as WMLP . A GCN-
based classifier for graph classification can be described using eq. (1), (2) and (3) as introduced above.
For simplicity, we summarize it as yo = fGCN (G|θGCN ), where θGCN includes all the parameters
in the model.
3 Problem Formulation
In this work, we aim to build an attacker T that takes a graph as input and modify the structure of the
graph to fool a GCN classifier. Modifying a graph structure is equivalent to modify its adjacency
matrix. The function of the attacker can be represented as follows
G˜ = T (G) = {T (A),X} = {A˜,X} (4)
Given a classifier f(·), the goal of the attacker is to modify the graph structure so that the classifier
outputs a different label from what it originally predicted. Note here, we neglect the θ inside f(·), as
the classifier is already trained and fixed. Mathematically, the goal of the attacker can be represented
as: f(T (G)) 6= f(G).
As described above, in fact, the attacker T is specifically designed for a given classifier f(·). To
reflect this in the notation, we now denote the attacker for the classifier f(·) as Tf . In our work,
the attacker Tf has limited knowledge of the classifier. The only information the attacker can get
from the classifier is the label of (modified) graphs. In other words, the classifier f(·) is treated as a
black-box model for the attacker Tf .
An important constraint to the attacker Tf is that it is only allowed to make “unnoticeble” changes to
the graph structure. To account for this, we propose the rewiring operation, which is supposed to
make more subtle changes than adding or deleting edges. We will show that the rewiring operation
can better preserve a lot of important properties of the graph compared to adding or deleting edges in
Section 4.1. The definition of the proposed rewiring is given below:
Definition 1. A rewiring operation a involves three nodes and it can be denoted as a =
{vfir, vsec, vthi}, where vsec ∈ N1(vfir) and vthi ∈ N2(vfir)/N1(vfir). Nk(vfir) denotes the
k-th hop neighbors of vfir and the sign / stands for exclusion. The rewiring operation deletes the
existing edge between nodes vfir and vsec, while adding an edge to connect nodes vfir and vthi.
The attacker Tf is given a budget of K proposed rewiring operations to modify the graph structure.
A straightforward way to set K is choosing a small fix number. However, it is likely that graphs in
a given data set have various graph sizes. The same number of rewiring operations can affect the
graphs of different size in various magnitude. Thus, it may not be appropriate to use the same K for
all the graphs. A more suitable way is to allow flexible number of rewiring operations according to
the graph size. Thus, we propose to use K = p · |E| for a given graph G, where p ∈ (0, 1) is a ratio.
The process of the attacker on a graph G can be now denoted as:
Tf (G)↔ (a1, a2, . . . , aM )[G] (5)
where the right hand part means to sequentially apply the rewiring operations a1, . . . , aM to the
graph G, and M is the number of rewiring operations taken with M ≤ K.
4 Rewiring-based Attack to Graph Convolutional Networks
Next, we first discuss the properties of proposed rewiring operation to show its advantages. We then
introduce the proposed attacking framework ReWatt based on reinforcement learning and rewiring.
4.1 Properties of the Proposed Rewiring Operation
The proposed rewiring operation has several advantages compared to simply adding or deleting edges.
One obvious advantage of the proposed rewiring operation is that it does not change the number of
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nodes, the number of edges and the total degree of a graph. However, operations like “adding” or
“deleting” edges may change those properties.
Many important graph properties are based on the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix of a graph [3]
such as Algebraic Connectivity [9] and Effective Graph Resistance [8]. A detailed description of
Algebraic Connectivity and Effective Graph Resistance are given in Appendix . Next, we demonstrate
that the proposed rewiring operation is likely to make smaller changes to eigenvalues, which result in
unnoticeable changes under graph Laplacian based measures. For a graph G with A as its adjacency
matrix, its Laplacian matrix L is defined as L = D−A, where D is the diagonal degree matrix [18].
Let λ1, . . . , λ|V| denote the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix arranged in the increasing order
with x1, . . . ,x|V| being the corresponding eigenvectors. We show how a single proposed rewiring
operation affects the eigenvalues. Our analysis is based on the following lemma:
Lemma 1. [22] Let (αi,hi) be the eigen-pairs of a symmetric matrix M ∈ RN×N . Given a
perturbation ∆M to matrix M, its eigenvalues can be updated by ∆αi = hTi ∆Mhi.
The proof can be found in [22]. Using this lemma, we have the following corollary
Corollary 1. For a given graph G with Laplacian matrix L, one proposed rewiring operation
(vfir, vsec, vthi) affects the eigen-value λi by ∆λi, for i = 1, . . . , |V|, where
∆λi = (2xi[fir]− xi[thi]− xi[sec])(xi[sec]− xi[thi]) (6)
where xi[index] denotes the index-th value of the eigenvector xi.
The proof can be found in Appendix B (in the supplementary file).
Furthermore, each eigenvalue λi of the Laplacian matrix measures the “smoothness” of its corre-
sponding eigenvector xi [21, 20]. The “smoothness” of an eigenvector measures how different its
elements are from their neighboring nodes. Thus, the first few eigenvectors with relatively small
eigenvalues are rather “smooth”. Note that in the proposed rewiring operation, vsec is the direct
neighbor of vfir and vthi is the 2-hop neighbor of vfir. Thus, the difference xi[fir] − xi[thi] is
expected to be smaller than the difference xi[fir]− xi[can], where xi[can] can be any other node
that is further away. This means that the proposed rewiring operation (to 2-hop neighbors) is likely to
make smaller changes to the first few eigenvalues than rewiring to any further away nodes or adding
an edge between two nodes that are far away from each other.
4.2 Graph Adversarial Attack with Reinforcement Learning
Given a graph G, the process of the attacker T is a general decision making process M =
(S,A, P,R), where A = {at} is the set of actions, which consists of all valid rewiring opera-
tions, S = {st} is the set of states that consists of all possible intermediate and final graphs after
rewiring, P is the transition dynamics that describes how a rewiring action at changes the graph
structure p(st+1|, st, . . . , s1, at). R is the reward function, which gives the reward for the action
taken at a given state. Thus, the procedure of attacking a graph can be described by a trajectory
(s1, a1, r1, . . . , sM , aM , rM ), where s1 = G. The key point for the attacker is to learn how to
make the decision of picking a suitable rewiring action when at the state st. This can be done by
learning a policy network to get the probability p(at|st, . . . , s1) and sample the rewiring operation
correspondingly. Modelling in this way, the decision making at a state st is dependant on all its
previous states, which could be difficult to model due to the long-term dependency. It is easy to
notice that the intermediate states st are all predicted to have the same label as the original graph.
Thus, we can treat each of the states as a brand new graph to be attacked regardless of what leads
to it. That is to say, the decision making at the state st can be solely dependant on the current state,
p(at|st, . . . , s1) = p(at|st). Thus, we model the process of attack as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP) [23]. Hence, we adopt reinforcement learning to learn how to make effective decisions. We
name the proposed framework as ReWatt. The key elements of the environment for the reinforcement
learning are defined as follows:
State Space The state space of the environment consists of all the intermediate graphs generated
after all the possible rewiring operations.
Action Space The action space consists of all the valid rewiring operations as defined in Definition 1.
Note that the valid action space is dynamic when the state changes, as the k-th hop neighbors are
different in different states.
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State Transition Dynamics Given an action (rewiring operation) at = {vfir, vsec, vthi} at state st.
The next state st+1 is achieved by deleting the edge between vfir and vsec in the current state st and
adding an edge to connect vfir with vthi.
Reward Design The main goal of the attacker is to make the classifier f(·) predict a different label
than originally predicted. We also encourage the attacker to take as few actions as possible so that the
modification to the graph structure is minimal. Thus, we assign a positive reward when the attack is
successful and assign a negative reward for each action step taken. The reward R(st, at) is given as
R(st, at) =
{
1 if f(st) 6= f(s1);
nr if f(st) = f(s1).
where nr is the negative reward to penalize each step taken. Similar to how we set a flexible rewiring
budget K, here we propose to use nr = − 1K = − 1p·|E| , which depends on the size of the graph.
Termination The attack process will stop either when the number of actions reaches the budget K or
the attacker successfully “changed” the label of the slightly modified graph.
4.3 Policy Network
In this subsection, we introduce the policy network to learn the policy p(at|st) on top of the graph
representations learned by GCN. However, this GCN is different from the target classifier one, since
it has 2 convectional layers. To choose a valid proposed rewiring action, we decompose the rewiring
action to 3 steps: 1) choosing an edge et = (ve1 , ve2) from the set of edges of the intermediate graph
st; 2) determining vet1 or vet2 to be vfirt and the other to be vsect ; and 3) choosing the third node
vthit from N
2
st(vfirt)/N
1
st(vfirt). Correspondingly, we decompose p(at|st) as follows
p(at|st) = pedge(et|st) · pfir(vfirt |et, st) · pthi(vthit |vfirt , et, st) (7)
We design three policy networks based on GCN to estimate the three distributions in the right hand of
the equation (7), which will be introduced next. To select an edge from the edge set Est , we generate
the edge representation from the node representations Fst ∈ R|Vst |×dF learned by GCN. For an edge
e = (ve1 , ve2), the edge representation can be represented as e = concat(ust , h(Fst [e1, :],Fst [e2, :
])), where ust is the graph representation of the state st, h(·, ·) is a function to combine the two
node representations and concat(·, ·) denotes the concatenation operation. We include ust in the
representation of the edge to incorporate the graph information when making the decision. The
representation of all the edges in Est can be represented as a matrix Est ∈ R|Est |×2dF , where each
row represents an edge. The probability distribution over all the edges can be represented as
pedge(·|st) = softmax(MLP (Est |θedge)), (8)
where we use MLP (·|θedge) to denote a Multilayer Perceptron that maps Est ∈ R|Est |×2dF to a
vector in R|Est |, which, after going through the softmax layer, represents the probability of choosing
each edge. Let et = (vet1 , vet2) denote the edge sampled according to eq. (8). To decide which node
is going to be the first node, we estimate the probability distribution over these two nodes as
pfir(·|et, st) = softmax(MLP ([vet1 ,vet2 ]T |θfir)) (9)
where veti = concat(et,Fst [eti, :]) ∈ R3dF for i = 1, 2. The first node can be sampled from the
two nodes vet1 , vet2 according to eq. (9). We then proceed to estimate the probability distribution
p(·|vfirt , et, st). For any node vc ∈ N2(vfirt)/N1(vfirt), we use vˆc = concat(vet1 ,Fst [c, :])
to represent it. The representations for all the nodes in N2(vfirt)/N
1(vfirt) can be represented
by a matrix Vˆst ∈ R|N
2(vfirt )/N
1(vfirt )|×4dF with each row representing a node. The probability
distribution of choosing the third node over all the candidate nodes can be modeled as:
pthi(·|vfirt , et, st) = softmax(MLP (Vˆst |θthi)) (10)
The third node vthit can be sampled from the set of candidate nodes N
2(vfirt)/N
1(vfirt) according
to the probability distribution in eq (10). An action at can be generated by sequentially estimating
and sampling from the probability distributions in eq. (8), (9) and (10).
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Figure 1: The overall framework of ReWatt
4.4 Proposed Framework - ReWatt
With the rewiring and the policy network defined above, our overall framework is shown in Figure 1.
With State st, the Attacker uses GCN to learn node and edge embeddings, which are used as input
to Policy Networks to make decision about the next action. Once the new action is sampled from
the policy network, rewiring is performed on st and we arrive in the new state st+1. We query
the black-box classifier to get the prediction f(St+1), which is compared with f(s1) to get reward.
Policy gradient [23] is adopted to learn the policies by maximizing the rewards.
5 Experiment
In this section, we conduct experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed framework
ReWatt. We also carry out a study to analyze how the trained attacker works.
5.1 Attack Performance
To demonstrate the effectiveness of ReWatt, we conduct experiments on three widely used social
network data sets [14] for graph classification, i.e., REDDIT-MULTI-12K, REDDIT-MULTI-5K and
IMDB-MULTI [27]. The statistics can be found in Appendix C (in the supplementary file).
In this work, the classifier we target to attack is the GCN-based classifier as introduced in Section 2.
We set the number of layers to 3 and use max-pooling as the pooling function to get the graph
representation. Note that we need to train the classifier using a fraction of the data and then treat the
classifier as a black box to be attacked. We then use part of the remaining data to train the attacker
and use the rest of the data to test the performance of the attacker. Thus, for each data set, we split it
into three parts with the ratio of a% : b% : c%, where a% of the data set is used to train the classifier,
b% of the data set is used to train the attacker and the remaining c% of the data set is used to test the
performance of the attacker. For the REDDIT-MULTI-12K and REDDIT-MULTI-5K data sets, we
set a = 90, b = 8 and c = 2. As the size of the IMDB-MULTI data set is quite small, to have enough
data for testing, we set a = 50, b = 30 and c = 20.
We compare the attacking performance of the proposed framework with the RL-S2V proposed in [6],
random selection method and some variants of our proposed framework. We briefly describe these
baselines: 1) RL-S2V is a reinforcement learning based attack framework [6], which allows adding
and deleting edges to the graph with a fixed budget for all the graphs; 2) Random denotes an attacker
that performs the proposed rewiring operations randomly; 3) Random-s is also based on random
rewiring. Note that ReWatt can terminate before using all the budget. We record the actual number of
rewiring actions made in our method and only allow the Random-s to take exactly the same number
of rewiring actions as ReWatt; 4) ReWatt-n denotes a variant of the ReWatt, where the negative
reward is fixed to −0.5 for all the graphs in the testing set; and 5) ReWatt-a is a variant of ReWatt,
where we allow any nodes in the graph to be the third node vthit instead of only 2-hop neighbors.
As RL-S2V only allows a fixed budget for the all the graphs, when comparing to it, for ReWatt, we
also fix the number of proposed rewiring operations to a fixed number K for all the graphs. Note
that a single proposed rewiring operation involves two edges, thus, for a fair comparison, we allow
the RL-S2V to take 2K actions (adding/deleting edges). We set K = 1, 2, 3 in the experiments. To
compare with the random selection method and the variants of ReWatt, we use flexible budget, more
specially, we allow at most p · |Ei| proposed rewiring operations for graph Gi. Here, p is a fixed
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Table 1: Performance comparison in terms of success rate
REDDIT-MULTI-12K REDDIT-MULTI-5K IMDB-MULTI
K 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
ReWatt 14.4% 21.6% 23.4% 8.99% 16.9% 18.0% 23.0% 23.3% 23.3%
RL-S2V 9.46% 18.5% 21.1% 4.49% 16.9% 18.0% 2.00% 6.00% 3.33%
p 1% 2% 3% 1% 2% 3% 1% 2% 3%
ReWatt 25.2% 32.9% 38.7% 11.2% 20.2% 27.0% 23.0% 23.0% 23.3%
ReWatt-a 26.1% 35.1% 42.8% 5.60% 21.3% 30.3% 24.3% 25.0% 25.6%
ReWatt-n 17.6% 25.7% 31.1% 5.60% 14.6% 19.1% 21.3% 21.3% 21.6%
random 10.3% 15.7% 21.6% 3.30% 12.4% 16.9% 1.33% 1.33% 1.66%
random-s 6.30% 6.70% 9.45% 5.60% 6.74% 11.0% 1.00% 1.33% 1.66%
percentage and we set it to p = 1%, 2%, 3% in our experiments. We use the success rate as measure
to evaluate the performance of the attacker. A graph is said to be successfully attacked if its label is
changed when it is modified within the given budget.
The results are shown in Table 1. From the table, we can make the following observations: 1)
Compared to RL-S2V, ReWatt can perform more effective attacks. Especially, in the IMDB-MULTI
data set, where ReWatt outperforms the RL-S2V with a large margin; 2) ReWatt outperforms the
Random method as expected. Especially, ReWatt is much more effective than Random-s which
performs exactly the same number of proposed rewiring operations ReWatt. This also indicates that
the Random method uses more rewiring operations for successful attacking than ReWatt; 3) The
variant ReWatt-a outperforms ReWatt, which means if we do not constraint the rewiring operation to
2-hop neighbors, the performance of ReWatt can be further improved. However, as we discussed in
earlier sections, this may lead to more “noticeable” changes of the graph structure; and 4) ReWatt-n
performs worse than our ReWatt, which shows the advancement of using a flexible reward design.
5.2 Attacker Analysis
In this subsection, we carry out experiments to analyze how ReWatt’s change in graph structure
affects the graph representation u calculated by eq. (2) and the logits P (the output immediately
after the softmax layer of the classifier). For convenience, we denote the original graph as Go and
the attacked graph as Ga in this section. Correspondingly, the graph representation and logits for
the original (attacked) graph are denoted as uo (ua) and Po (Pa), respectively. To measure the
difference in graph representation, we used the relative difference in terms of 2-norm defined as
RC(uo,ua) = ‖u
a−uo‖2
‖uo‖2 . The logits denote the probability distribution that the given graph belongs
to each of the classes. Thus, we use the KL-divergence [16] to measure the difference between the
logits of the original and attacked graphs KL(Po,Pa) =
C∑
i=1
Po[i] log
(
Po[i]
Pa[i]
)
, where C is the number
of classes in the data set and P[i] denotes the logit for the i-th class.
We perform the experiments on the REDDIR-MULTI-12K data set under the setting of allowing
at most 3% · |E| proposed rewiring operations. The results for the graph representation and logits
are shown in Figure 2 and Figure 3, respectively. The graphs in the testing set are separated in two
groups, one group contains all the graphs successfully attacked by ReWatt (shown in Figure 2a and
Figure 3a), and the other one contains those survived from ReWatt’s attack (shown in Figure 2b and
Figure 3b). Note that, for comparison, we also include the results of Random-s on these two groups
of graphs. In these figures, a single point represents a testing graph, the x-axis is the ratio M|E| , where
M is the number of rewiring operations ReWatt used before the attacking process terminating. Note
that M can be smaller than the budget as the process terminates once the attack successes.
As we can observed from the figures, compared with the Random-s, ReWatt can make more changes
to both the graph representation and logits, using exactly the same number of proposed rewiring
operations. Comparing Figure 2a with Figure 2b, we find that the perturbation generated by ReWatt
affects the graph representation a lot even when it fails to attack the graph. This means our attack is
perturbing the graph structure in a right way to fool the classifier, although it fails potentially due to
the limited budget. Similar observation can be made when we compare Figure 3a with Figure 3b.
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Figure 2: The change of graph representation after attack
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6 Related Work
In recent years, adversarial attacks on deep learning models have attracted increasing attention
in the area of computer vision. Many deep models are found to be easily fooled by adversarial
samples, which are generated by adding deliberately designed unnoticeable perturbation to normal
images [25, 11]. More algorithms with different level access to the target classifier have been
proposed, including white-box attack models, which have access to the gradients [19, 17, 2] and
black-box attack model, which have limited access to the target classifier [4, 5, 13].
Most of the aforementioned works are focusing in the computer vision domain, where the data sample
can be represented in the continues space. Few attention has been payed into the discrete data structure
such as graphs. Graph Neural Networks have been shown to bring impressive advancements to many
different graph related tasks such as node classification and graph classification. Recent researches
show that the graph neural networks are also venerable to adversarial attacks. [31] proposed a greedy
algorithm to perform adversarial attack to node classification task. Their algorithm tries to change
the label of a target node by modifying both the graph structure and node features. [6] proposed
a deep reinforcement learning based attacker to attack both the node classification and the graph
classification task. [32] designed an algorithm to impair the overall performance of node classification
based on meta learning. All the three mentioned methods modify the graph structure by adding or
deleting edges. A more recent work [26] on attacking node classifications proposed to modify the
graph structure by adding fake nodes. In this work, we propose to modify the graph structure using
rewiring, which is shown to make less noticeable changes to the graph structure.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a graph rewiring operation, which affect the graph structure in a less
noticeable way than adding/deleting edges. The rewiring operation preserves some basic graph
properties such as number of nodes and number of edges. We then designed an attacker ReWatt based
on the rewiring operations using reinforcement learning. Experiments in 3 real world data sets show
the effectiveness of the proposed framework. Analysis on how the graph representation and logits
change while the graph being attacked provide us with some insights of the attacker.
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A Graph Laplacian Based Measures
Many important graph properties are based on the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix of a graph [3]. Here we
list few:
• Algebraic Connectivity The algebraic connectivity of a graph G is the second-smallest eigenvalue of its
Laplacian matrix [9]. Note that we only consider connected graphs in this work, so it is always larger than 0.
The larger the algebraic connectivity is, the more difficult it is to separate the graph into components (i.e.,
more edges need to be removed). The algebraic connectivity has previously been applied to measure network
robustness [24].
• Effective Graph Resistance The effective graph resistance is a graph measure derived from the field of
electric circuit analysis, where it is defined as the summation of effective resistance over all node pairs [8].
The effective graph resistance can be represented using the eigenvalues of Laplacian matrix as follows [8]
Re = |V| ·
|V|∑
i=2
λi. (11)
By Corollary 2, we can represent the change of the algebraic connectivity λ2 as:
∆λ2 = (2x2[fir]− x2[thi]− x2[sec])(x2[sec]− x2[thi]) (12)
According to the above discussion, ∆λ2 is expected to be smaller for the operation of rewiring to 2-hop neighbor.
Thus, the rewiring to 2-hop neighbor operation is expected to perturb the algebraic connectivity less compared
with adding an edge between two nodes that are far away from each other. A similar argument can be built for
effective graph resistance.
B Proof of Collary 1
Corollary 2. For a given graph G with Laplacian matrix L, one proposed rewiring operation (vfir, vsec, vthi)
affects the eigen-value λi by ∆λi, for i = 1, . . . , |V|, where
∆λi = (2xi[fir]− xi[thi]− xi[sec])(xi[sec]− xi[thi]) (13)
where xi[index] denotes the index-th value of the eigenvector xi.
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Proof. Let ∆L denotes the change in the Laplacian matrix after applying the rewiring operation (vfir, vsec, vthi)
to graph G. Then we have ∆L[fir, sec] = ∆L[sec, fir] = 1, ∆L[fir, thi] = ∆L[thi, fir] = −1,
∆L[sec, sec] = −1, ∆L[thi, thi] = 1 and 0 elsewhere. Thus
∆λi = x
T
i ∆Lxi
= 2xi[fir]xi[sec]− xi[sec]2 + xi[thi]2 − 2xi[fir]xi[thi]
= xi[thi]
2 − xi[sec]2 + 2xi[fir](xi[sec]− xi[thi])
= (2xi[fir]− xi[thi]− xi[sec])(xi[sec]− xi[thi])
which completes the proof.
C Statistics of the Datasets
The statistics of the datasets are given in Table 2.
Table 2: Statistics of the data sets
# graphs # labels
REDDIT-MULTI-12K 11,929 12
REDDIT-MULTI-5K 4,999 5
IMDB-MULTI 1,500 3
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